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in the nineteenth century; today "mentalism" has taken this place. /\ cOOlmon framework for the pln'sical and physiological sciences resulted from expcriments-experiments such as the synthesis of urea. I helieve that a framework common to the ph~siological and hehadoral sciences is emerging from e:xperimenls-especially neurobeha\'ioral experiments.
Neurobehavioral data are already sufficient to allow first attemptã t lawful systematiz2tion. Systematic presentation of data that unite the now disparate and often discordant \'iews of man's uni\'erse can be one of thc major achie\"Cmenls of the second half of the twentieth century. Such an achien'lllent can make the further step to socially practical consequences only to thc extcnt that the presentation becomes part of the educational process. Toward this end, the suggestion is offered that neuropsychiatry, which now is practically devoid of training in any basic discipline related to its hody of knowledge, make an effort to nourish the lusty neuropsychological infant.
TIlE MIND·BRAIN RELATIONSHIP
What Is Neurop1lychology?
The empirical eddence upon which translations between psychological and neurological concepts can be based are the results of neurobehavioral experiments and observations. The systematization of such evidence constitutes the science of neurops)·chology. By definition, neuropsychology is a reducti\'e discipline. As such, it partakes of the characteristics of its non reductive siblings, psychology and neurology; The three sciences differ in that the dependent variables used to gather rele\'ant data represent the interaction of different systems of independent variables. Though all three sciences have in common a reference toenvirottment-systems of independent variables that can be cotrtpletely specified by the techniques of the physical sciences1-psychological and neurological sciences differ in the systems of variables specified by biological techniques: in the psychological sciences these systertls refer to the \vhole organism, in the neurological sciences to only part of that organism. Neuropsychology, if it is to be effectively reductive, must rdate all three systems of variabies: environmental, organismic, and neuraL When structural concepts are under consideration, these distinctions appear self-evident;' However, when function is in question, the temptation arises to confound two of these three classes of independent variables. The neurologist is prone to disregard the distinction between organism and en\,ironnient-psycholo-I Social environment is excluded here for purposes of simplification, See the section Bridging Laws and Me/hods of S)'Jlema/izing for an analysis of this asprct of the problem.
gizing of neural processes follows and activity in the brain-stem reticular formation becomes identified with consciousness. On the other hand, the psychologist is prone to disregard the distinction between organism and its parts-neurologizing of the psychological process is a common consequence, and drive becomes synonymous with hypothalamic function.
Three corollaries follow from these basic statements. One is a general proposition regarding the limitations of reductive disciplines. The properties of a system are not given simply by summing the properties of the component subsystems. An understanding of the wetness of water or the fact that it floats when frozen is not deri,·ed solely from an understanding of the properties of its constituents, hydrogen and oxygen. The property, coalition, cannot be understood in terms of study of the behavior of the monadic or dyadic components of the group in which the coalition forms. The neural processes uncovered by neuropsychological analysis arc thus expected, at best, to have properties that critically determine those of the behavioral system-never are the neural and the behavioral proceJSer ide71 tical.
Second, according to these basic statements, clinical neurology (and neurosurgery) are neuropsychological as well as neurological disciplines, since many useful concepts are. derived from the neurological examination-an examination of the behavior of the patient under specified environmental conditions. Direct examination of the nervous system (e.g., by X rays) is, of course, recognized as such in tte clinic, but the behavioral aspects of the neurological examination and the resulting pr.vchological concepts (e.g., the \'isual field) are seldom recognized for what they arc. The kinship between clinical ne.urology and experimental neuropsychology is not a superficial one and the current lack of communication between the two endeavors must be remedied.
Third, there is a danger that the neurologist ami neurosurgeonand the experimental neuropsychologist associated with the clinic-make the error of early introspectionists in psychology. The propositional verbal reports of introspections of patient,> whose brains have lesions or are being excited in the surgery are insufficient in themselves to provide more than the initial fragments of data for a scientific neuropsychology. Concepts deri,·ed from these fragments must be validated by the use of other nonlinguistic beha\'ioral techniques lest ambiguity result. Statements ahout consciousness, sensations, and the like are sufficiently vague to allow multiple interpretations. Precision is attained when the situations in which nrbal reports are obtained are varied, and several nonpropositional \'crbal or other bcha"ioral dependent variables, preferably measurable ones, are used. Unless this is accomplished, identical data can be variously construed: e.g., electrical stimulation of the temporal isocortex of unane;;thetizcd Tllan results in verbal rcports of experiences not unlike those which can be~pontaneou~ly recalled. On thi~ha~i~, the interpretation has been made at one time that the temporal isocortex serHS memOf'y-at another time, that perceptions are located there. Obdously, either the data or the concepts or hoth arc imprecise.. \nd the~e deficiencie~can readily be remedied (see the section On the Neurology of Intention and Will).
Neural Variables Critical to neha\~or
This approach to the relation hetween psychology and neurology places emphasis on a lahoratory analy~is of prohlclll~that are oFten initiallyposed introspecth·ely. Such a prohlem-oriented neuropsychological cience need not be technique-hound and is free to search through all sorts of phenomena..\fter all,~cientific endeayor so often hegins with childlike wonders, such as the obseryation that one can "attend" an ohject other than that upon which the gaze is fixed. This wonder and the many like it are not different in kind frolll those concerned with the fall of an apple or the whistle of the steaming kettlc. But the empirical solution to the problem differs-in the case of the falling apple or the whistling kettle, the relations are between physical objects in the environment of the obseryer; in the cAse of attention. hetween the obsen'er and his em-ironment. To o\'ercome the difficulties po~cd by this difference, the fir't step to empirical solution of the psychological problems must he that the observer obscn'es other obsen'ers whose reports can be collated with his own obsen'ations-the behaviorist's approar.h. Just as a precise specification of the variables that determine falling and whistling is possible, so also a precise specification of the ,'ariahles that determine attending is possible. But only some of these variahles tum out to he critical, i.e., in any system of interacting variahlcs. only the properties of some determine the essential characterbtics of the system as a whole. The molecular properties of water. when heated, and the dimensional properties of the opening in the tea kettle critically determine the whistle; the particular type of heating element. the shape of the kettle, :md the wetnes.s of water are irrelevant, thrHlgh heat, kettle, and water are necessary constituents of the system. In like manner, though mtlch of the organism and certain aspects of em'ironment are neces."ary con.~tituents of the systems of variahlesthat descrihe attending, only some of them can be considered critical. For complex mental processes-attending, judgment, attitude, and thought-critical organismic "ariables appear to be located in the brain: the behavior from which these complex processes are inferred remains es.c;entially unimpaired after a man has suffered a fairly high cervical transection of his spinal axis-an observation which has led to the notion that the head is not hollow [II] . And this notion is supported by evidence that such behaviors are deranged i,iihen the hrain is injured or artificially irritated. Experiments can therefore be performed to add precision to the notion. For example, exactly what are the neural mechanisms that make it possible to fix the gaze on one object and yet respond reliably to another? Though the answer to this particular question is not yet available, answers to similar questions can be obtained. An example of such an answer follows.
ON THE NEUROLOGY OF INTENTION AND WILL: AN EXAMPLE OF NEUROBEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
The concept of will has a peculiar place in neuropsychology today, On the one hand, experimentalists of the behaviorist tradition usually dismiss the issues subsumed as recalcitrant to direct observation. On the other, to neurologists, the terms voluntary mouement and willed action are part of the everyday language used uncritically in the clinic and in the surgical amphitheater. The gap between these realms of endeamr and their universes of discourse seems indeed great. Yet rapprochement might be more easily achieved than appears at first glance. Properties of the "operant" of the behaviorist have been compared and identified by some with those of \'oluntary behavior of man [20] . .-\ large body of evidence about intent has been gathered by those interested in clinical and social problems in psychology [24] . And the neurological data that,re rele\'ant to these issues are by no means sparse [32, 8] . Experiments undertaken to help bridge the gap are feasible.
The case for will is to be presented somewhat as follows: Certain basal forebrain structures have been shown to control relatively simple appetitive behavior, e.g., eating. The question is asked whether these structures are concerned exclusively with the regulation of such drh'es or whether their concern extends to other appetitive-like beha\'ior sequences.
Experiments are described which show the effects of lesions of these forebrain systems to be due to interference with anacti\'e build-up of an adaptive neural process used by the organism to identify the invariant and recurrent properties of his environment.
Next is pursued the proposal that the organism's own behavior and its consequences become a part of the total stimulus situation which the organism internalizes. The neural nature of this internalization process is examined and its relation to error sensitivity is discussed. The suggestion is made that thus intentions-the identification and prediction of the consequences of actions-are initiated.
Finally, another experiment is presented to show that, once they are initiated, intentions often guide behavior somewhat independently of the immediate outcome of any particular action. ,\dequate or erroneous p('rformance~, e,'en though identified, must he ahle to modify the existin!! neural representation in order to ,gain acti"e control o"er hehavior. This fart is clearly hrought out hy the experiment which demonstrates that~e'Tral altel'llatin', thou,gh predictahle, re~ponse patterns serye (qualh' \\TII to reduce error. The most forward part of the frontal cortex of primates is~hown to he concerned with this type of choice among the alternati\'c pcrfllrrnancc~. Thi~choice depends not on situational ,'ariahles per 5e and therefore not on those a~pects of the model built up within th~hrain that deal with identifications of the properties of the en\'ironmcnl. Ratlwr. the choice is guided hy some other neural procc~s that determincs the di.;trilJlJtion of re~pon5e5...\nd it is argued that it is thc~e intentional determinants of choice that make plausihle the concept of \dU.
The Initiation of Inh.'ntions.
Operant hclla"ior is tested in a situation in which a simple response pattern is u<ed as an indicator of an organism's actions in that situation [10] , The apparatlls u<ed in this serie~~of experiments is simiiar to the one-armed handit familiar to those who inhabit gamhling institutions. :\nc\ the "wiilfur' heha\'ior of the monkeys, apparently guided only remo{cly hy the outcomes of their actions, is also familiar to those who h.1\'e watched any hut the most "skillful" gamhlers in action.
.-\t least three sets of measures were found useful/\-related to the nents that determine this operant behavior. One of the~e is the number of reinforcements ohtained per unit time. Another is the rate at which the re~ponse takes place. Finally, the distrihution of responses across any time unit can be specified. Perhaps the simplest of the situations in which this measurement can be applied is the so-called "fixed-inten'al situation." In this, an organi~m is permitted to make a respome and, at some predetermined and equal time inten'al regulated by a clock, he is given a signal that the response is appropriate (a reward) 0 In such a situation, the organism tends to group his re~ponses in the period just prior to the occurrence of the reward. ;\s a rule, a gradualiy increasing numher of response'i i'i made-the increase reaching it'i maximum immediately prior to the occasion for reward. When responses are recorded cumulath'cIy o,·er time, a smooth "scallop" de'icrihes theheh'a~·ior 'bf 'the organism in this situation. The three measures of the beha\'ior already noted can he taken: (t) the numher of reinforcements obtained during a training session; (2) the total numher of responses per unit time (the rate of response) ; and (3) the shape of the response eunoe (the scallop), which can he determined either hy recording the time between responses or b~· graphing the per cent of the total nUfnher of responses made during successive portions of the interval. Experiments were undertaken to find out ,whether these measures could be independently affected and, if they could, to note which changes in the environment and in the organism were related to each. lExperiment 1: tbe effect of food deprivation [35] . In this experiment, 12 rhesus monkeys were trained to press a le\"er in a situation in which a %-gram food pellet appeared in a tray every 2 min, provided the lever was pressed at least once at or after 2 min had elapsed since the last pellet was obtained. Each training session lasted 2 hr and the monkeys were fed a sufficient amount of laboratory chow immediately after each session to maintain them at approximately 80 per cent of the weight which they had attained after a 3-week period of ad libitum feeding. Daily weighing assured this 80 per cent figure. :\11 animals were tested e\"ery other day (except Sunday) for two hours until a stahle len,l of perfonnance was obtained. The occurrence of responses and pellcts obtained was recorded in two fashions: (I) on a mO\"ing paper tape in which an ink writer stepped perpendicular to the time axis whene\'er the lever was pressed, and a large, very brief excursion in the direction opposite to the step indicated the de/hoer)" of the pellet; (2) on counters so arranged a" to accumulate the number of responses made during each of six equal subdivisions of all of the total 2-min intenoals of a testing session. In this manner, a performance graph could be constructed for each of the testing sessions or for any multiple number of su~h sessions to demonstrate the distribution of responses across any numIJr of 2-min inten·als.."herages of the responses of groups of animals could be estahlished, and the \'ariations between performances of an animal or between individual animals could be taken into account.
The aim of this experiment was to find out whether the rate or the distribution of responses was the sensiti\"e index of changes that result from manipulations of food depri\·ation. The experiment cQnsisted of the following procedure. Ten 2-hr sessions were gi\"en. Then each animal was subjected to a 72-hr fast and retested for one session, after which the prefast schedule was immediately resumed-again for ten scssinm. The entire procedure was repeated once again; this time the monkeys were fasted for 118 hr before the test session.
The results are shown in Fig. I ...\s can he seen clearl)", the effects of food depri\"ation are upon the rate of response and not upon the number of reinforcements obtained nor upon the distribution of responses across the inten"al. Note the .minimal \"ariation hetween sessions and hetween animals. Rate,not response distrihution, is altered when monkeys are stan-ed from 3 to 5 da\"s.
Experiment 2: the effect of amygdalectomy [43] . The aim of this experiment was to discO\"er some of the neural mechanisms that reg-ulale these alterations uf the rate of response t1ut arc determined 1)\" fond dc- . . [50] , it apprarrd likely that hilateral remm'al of the amygdaloid complex in the basal forehrain would affect the rate-deprivation interaction. The experimental procedure was essentially the same as that t15ed in Experiment I, except that two groups of lour monkeys each were used. One sen'ed as an unopcrated control group; the monkeys in the other had heen given a one-stage bilateral amygdalectorny some 6 months prior to testing.
The results are plotted in Fig. 2 . The changes are those in performance of operated and unoperated monkeys which follow prolonged deprivation of food in the same situations as were described in Experiment 1. When amygdalectomized monkeys are used, they are far less responsive than normal monkeys to the deprivation, although they are by no means insensitive to it. The over-all group difference averaging across sessions is significant by analysis of variants at well heyond the 0.05 level (F = 7.25 for 1 and 6 dF).
70-hr food deprivation 150
. . .. hlterpn:tlltivn of experiments I and 2. How is this effect of amygdalectomy to be interpreted? .\mygdalectomized animals tend to eat more in an ad libitum feeding situation [37, . This ,.,.ould point to an increa~ed food drive in these animals. Yet they also show decreased responsiveness to prolonged deprivation. This consistently lower In'e1 of performance with prolonged depri\'ation could be interpreted to show that under these conditions amygdalectomized monkeys ha\'e a lower than normal drive for food. Perhaps a single process could be concei\'ed to be so impaired that the organism knows neither when he is hungry nor when he is sated. Or separate appetiti\'e "start" and satiety "stop" processes could be involved and reciprocally affected by the brain lesion.
There is an alternath'e way to interpret the more persistent pattern of re~pondin~by the alllygdakctomized monkeys. Rather than postulate an impairment specific to food hunger and satiety, the more sustained respon~e (whether of not eating or of eating) may be symptomatic of a ,~eneral disturbance in habituation proce1\.~es that extends to classes of stimuli other than food. Thus, amygdalectomized animals are reported to be~enerally more responsi"e as well as persisterit in their response to objects in their em'ironment-the so-called "hypermetamorphotic reaction" (of Wernicke) described by Kliher and Ducy. The operated monkeys also show much less of a locomotor-reaction decrement with repeated tests in a nOHI situation [51] . These findings suggest that general habituation factors are presumably im'olved in so far as satiation arises from repeated exteroceptive sensory consequences of food, in addition to postingestional consequences. Amygdaloid hyperphagia would, therefore, be interpreted in terms of some form of general defect in satiation or habituation not specific to food consumption.:
'." Experiment 3: transposition [44] . In this experirilent', nie notion of a generalized defect in habituation was tested by examining the performance ofamygdalectomized monkeys in a transposition situation. The tests were run in a modified Wisconsin General Testing Apparatus. Eight rhesus mo1Ikeys were used-four had had bilateral ahlations of the amygdaloid region approximately a year prior to this experiment; four sen'ed as unoperated control subjects. The Wisconsin General Testing Apparatus was fitted with a specially designed board, 18!4 in. high arid 24-in. long , that sloped toward the animal at an angle of 80°to the horizontal plane. The board contained two 4~) o-in. square cutouts, spaced 3% in. apart and 6 in. above the base, which accommodated a pair of stimulus panels measuring 4 by 4 in. Each stimulus panel was mounted on a frame hinged at the top to the board. Thus the panels could be swung open, allowing access to a small food cup located behind each one. The hinges were designed in such a way that the panels could be easily interchanged. Interposed between the board and the test cage was a mm'able one-way screen which shielded the board from the animal between trials. A distance of 6 in. separated the panels from the front bf the test cage. Two 40-watt fluorescent fixtures mounted above and to the side of the test cage provided the illumination.
The stimuli consisted of three different shades of gray; each painted on a separate panel. The grays were prepared by appropriate mixture of a flat black and a flat white paint so as to appear spaced equally apart. contrasting background for the stimuli. Both the stimuli and the board were sprayed lightly with a transparent fixative to minimize fingerprints and other stains. Several panels were prepared with each of the grays so that a given panel was never used throughout a test session.
Three days of preliminary training were required to accustom the animals to operate the panels and to retrieve a food reward. In this training the Ss received 30 trials a day with two black panels. Either response was rewarded except when persistent position biases developed. In this event, the opposite response was rewarded selectively until the position habit was broken. The reward used throughout the experiment consisted of half a peanut.
The formal testing began with a simultaneous form of gray discrimination. A dark-gray stimulus was paired with a medium-gray stimulus, with the medium gray as the positive stimulus, i.e., associated with the reward, for all animals. Thirty trials a day were given, using a noncorrection technique in i.vhich the positions of the stimuli were varied in a balanced order in accordance with a Gelierman procedure. The trials were spaced approximately 25 sec. apart. Training continued to a criterion of at least 90 per cent correct responses on each of 2 consecutive days.
The transposition tests followed the attainment of the criterion on the initial discrimination. The previously positive med~utn gray was now paired with a light-gray stimulus, and both were made positive. These conditions maximize the contribution of the prior training in the transposition performance. Six tests of transposition were carried out daily for two consecutive days during a continuation of the original discrimination procedure. Thus a total of 12 such observations was obtained. The transposition stimuli appeared in counterbalanced position on every fifth trial of these sessions. This meant that on 24 of the 30 trials the dark-gray and medium-gray stimuli were presented. On 6 of the trials the medium-gray and light-gray stimuli appeared.
The results show that the amygdalectomized monkeys tended to learn the brightness discrimination slightly more slowly than did the normal monkeys, but the differences were small and are not significant statistically. They required an average of 172 trials (range of 150 to 240) and 60 errors (range of 51 to 76) to reach criterion, exclusive of criterion performance. The normal animals averaged 112 trials (range of 90 to 150) and 48 errors (range of 34 to 69). A t test of these mean differences yields values of 2.25 and 1.60 for the two measures respecth·c1y, which for 6 dl do not reach the 0.05 level. Indeed, the differences obtained are exaggerated by the fact that, of all the animals, two in the lesion group missed by t error, attaining criterion in 120 instead of 150 trials.
The trampo~ition te~t~, on the other hand.~tron~ly differentiated the two groups. As shown in Table I , the normal animals markedly transposed their responses to the light gray. The o\'er-all median for the group was 11 transposed responses out of a possible 12, with little variability among animals, In contrast, the amygdalectomiied animals did not typi· cally transpose. Their median number of transposed responses' was 5.5. Three animals in the group approximated closely the chance level of performance, with perhaps a slight preference for the previously positive medium-gray stimulus. The fourth animal, which took longest to learn the original discrimination, exhibited a normal pattern of transposition. . In order to define better the characteristics of the irilpaired transposition behavior, an additional test was performed. A sequential fonn of brightness discrimination was presented in which the medium gray was paired randomly on different trials with either the dark gray or the light gray-in either event, the medium gray remained as the positive stimulus. I£ the amygdalectomized animals had indeed shown a stronger response tendency toward the previously positive stimulus of the transposition pair, then they would be expected to do relatively well on this sequential discrimination. If, on the other hand, their transposition perfonnance had simply reflected the transient effecl<; of a novel stimulus, then there would be little reason to expect any group differences on a test that involved frequent repetitions of the experimental condition. But in n~ither case would deleterious effecls of the lesion be anticipated. The results obtained, however, tend to rule out both these possibilities.
The same set of Ss that completed the transposition experiment was tested on the sequential-brightness &;crimination. They were given 30 trials a day, using a noncorrection technique." Each:,.pair,.ofl~timuli appeared in a randomized order on half the trials within a session. The criterion of learning was set at 90 per cent correct responses on each of 2 consecutive days. The sequential discrimination was separated from the last transposition test hy 2 additional days of training with the original pair of stimuli. All animals performed at criterion level on both of these sessions.
The results are summarized in Table 2 . The number of trials required by each group to meet criterion on the sequential discrimination demonstrates clearly a deficit in the performance of the amygdalectomized animals, although they were by no means unable to learn the problem. They required about five times as many trials to reach criterion as did the normal animals (p = 0.028 by a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U Test) . But the rapidity with which the normal animals mastered the problems must also be noted.
A comparison of the performance on the sequential discrimination with that on the original discrimination, expressed as a percentage change in the number of trials to criterion (Table 2 ), provides a check for any initial group differences. Examination of the data shows that the groups still differed markedly on this measure of performance in the sequential discrimination (p = 0.028). The normal animals mastered the sequential discrimination in about two-thirds fewer trials than they took to learn the original discrimination. The animals with lesions required about the same number of trials as before.
It can be seen from Table 3 that the difficulty which the amygdalectomized animals encountered on the sequential-brightnes.o; di:;crimination related almost exclusively to the presentations of the transposition pair of stimuli. About 95 per cent of their total errors occurred with the transposition stimuli. This accounts for virtually all of the differences in perfornlance between the groups on the sequential discrimination. Animal .'\1\1-405 showed this same form of impairment on the first 150 trials; then its performance pattern broke down into a more generally distributed deficit.
Interpretation of experiments 3 and 4. The transposition findings are consistent with the supposition that the effects of ann-gdalectomy transcend situations specific to the obtaining and consumption of food.
Amygdalectollly thus Illay he conceh'ed to produce some generalized defect in satiation or habituation. And additional evidence for this view comes from an entirely different source-the results of e1ectrophrsiologi-cal experiments. Stimulations of and recordings made from the basal forebrain structures such as the amygdaloid and hippocampal regions are interpreted. e.g., by Grastyan (l3J, to indicate that these structures nonnally function to prevent repeated diversions of attention and to make it possible for conditioning to occur.
The story goes something like this: An organism's exposure to a relati"ely intense novel em'ironmental stimulus is accomplished by generalized desychronization in the electrical acth'ity recorded from both isocortex and the basal forebrain (e.g.,' hippocampus). This startle reaction or orienting reflex is accompanied by behavioral arrest of movement except for head and eye (and perhaps body) orientation toward the stimulating e"ent, This initial state may give way to behavioral fight or flight. Of particular interest here, however, are those occasions where the original stimulus remains or is repeated and the organism becomes familiar with the events. In these instances, desynchronization of the isocorticallyrecorded electrical activity continues, but hypersynchronous slow waves are now obtained from the basal forebrain. When such hypersynchrony is experimentally induced in these structures, on-going problem-solving behavior is interfered with [26J in much the same fashion as when these structures are surgically removed [15, 40J. As already noted, animals with such lesions are hyperreactive to novel stimulation. The as.sumption is therefore made that the slow activity in the basal forebrain reflects the cessation of its usual gating action on the central effects of novel stimuli. (This gating action is conceived to take place "ia the brain-stem reticular formation.) This second stage is called the "orienting reaction"-to distinguish it from the orienting reflex-and is characterized by heightened behavioral orientation and attention to all aspects of the environment.
With repetition of the situation, however, another stage sets in-the organism is said to "habituate." This stage is again characterized by both isocortical and basal forebrain electrical desynchronization-though the isocortical manifestation is now no longer generalized but relati\'ely restricted, in the experimental situation, to the cortex subsen'ing the sensory mode through which the environmental stimulus has been presented.
E\'en more impressive evidence for the time course of the neural activity in\'Olved in this process has been demonstrated by E. Roy John and the Killams [18] , who employed electrical tracers in the form of visual-stimulus frequencies to which the brain's electrical activity becomes locked. Their tracer frequencies are found generally in recordings made from electrodes implanted in allo-and isocortical fonnulations during the initial stages of the problem-solving behavior of cats. ,-\S the experiment proceeds, these tracer frequencies become more limited in distribution until, during error-free performance; they are recorded only from the isocortical systems (geniculostriate) concerned with \·ision.
Furthermore, when such a problem-solving situation is used, W. Ross Adey [1,2,3] has sho;'vn, by a beautiful series of experifents, that basal forebrain eleCtrical activity (recorded from the hippocampus) is also characteristically different in the initial startle stage of the experiment and the final conditioned stage. :\s habituation proceeds, a shift is recorded in electrical phase of the activity of the se\'eral layers of the hippocampal cortex. In the initial stage, the electrical acth'ity of the layers that are connected with the brain-stem core (including the reticular fonnation) precedes that recorded froll! the layers more immediately connected to the isocortex; in the final stage, the phase relationship is re\'ersed. In this final stage in the problem-solving situation, the behavior of the habituated organism is appropriate to the task, i.e., perfornlance is approximately errorless. When occasional errors do occur, they are accompanied by the recrudescence of slow activity in the electrical record made from the basal forebrain! But what is this "habituation" [45] that thus becomes so all-important? Is it merely the fatiguing-out of the neural mechanism of attention? The indications from the animal experiments already reviewed are to the contrary. Sokolov [46] , in another exquisitely designed and performed series of experiments, has further demonstrated that habituation in man results to the extent that a neural representation of the stimulus is built up in the nervous system. When the input (e.g., a tone) matches this representation, no characteristic beha\·ioral. autonomic efTector, or electroencephalographic (EEG) responses can be recorded; when the input departs from prior inputs (e.g., diminution of the intensity of the tone, or making the tonc shorter or longer), it reevokes the orienting responses (bchavioral, autonomic efTector, and EEG). This ree\'ocation is limited to thc spccific occasions on, and durations over, which current input is disparatc from prior inputs! Taken together, thc electrophysiological and neuropsychological evidence points to a series of specifiable stages that can be summarized as follows:
1. When exposed to a novel e\'cnt, an organism takes this in-and this stage is accompanied by desynchronization of the electrical activity of both the isocortical and basal alJocortical formations of the endbrain. The only behavioral concomitants of this stage are "reflex" orientation movements that focus the stimulating e\'ent. Lacey [21] has noted that this stage corresponds pretty much to "primary attention" as this was defined in introspecth'e ps)'chology.
2. Should this novel event recur repeatedly, remain unchanged, or change relatively slowly, another process supervenes. This is characterized by continued desynchronization in the e1cctrical activity recorded from the isocortex, but a change in the acti':ity recorded from allocortical structures (especially of Ammon's formation). From this neural location, slow waves (i.e., hypersynchrony) can now be recorded. Beha\'iorally, searching characterizes the activity of the organism. This is the orienting reaction-the organism follows the stimulating event, searches when changes occur and especially once habituation is tinder way. In many respects, this is similar to the secondary attention described by the introspectionists.
3. After repeated exposure to the unchanging or recurrent event, habituation has resulted. The desynchronous electrical activity recorded from isocortex has become restricted to relevant input channels and slow activity has disappeared from allocortical structures. Here, electrical phase has shifted from precedence of brain-stein input to precedence of input from isocortex. And any noted change in the situation is immediately and specifically accompanied by recrudescence of the electrical activities in both the iso-and allocortex characteristic of stage 2 (the orienting stage).
During stage 3, the actions of the organism directed:toward the stimulating event may be included in the~abituation process. This obtains in conditioning and other problem-solving situations. So, orienting responses reemerge when the organism's actions resuit in changes from the recurrent regularities that characterize the total stimulus evente.g., when the oft-obtained reinforcing food stimulus fails to appear, or when the for-the-most-part-eliminated shock stimulus fails to be avoided.
In other words, the organism now has a mechanism for sensing error or incongruity!S The rudiment necessary to intentional beha\'ior is laid down.
Note that sensitivity to incongruity thus depends on maintenance . of a modifiahle neural representational process built up during habituation. Resection of the amygdaloid region of the forebrain could produce the reported behavior in the transposition experiments if, during the habituation that accompanied learning of the discrimination, an overly rigid representational process had been laid down. Something like a sharpening of the generalization gradient would be evident: i.e., the organism's behavior would remain invariant over a more restricted range of input events-he would be more sensitive to incongruity. So conceived, the normally functioning amygdaloid region is deemed necessary to the continued modification of neural representations--in the absence of the amygdaloid region, representation would become fixed, and these fixed representations would narrowly proscribe limits beyond which the organism would respond as if the situation were novel. This interpretation of the data is in essential agreement with an interpretation of the effects of amygdalectomy made earlier, but at that time restricted to behavior controlled by hypothalamic mechanisms [38] . The suggestion was forwarded then that amygdalectomy removes normal regulation on homeostatic processes-that, as a result of the surgery, the homeostat can get stuck either in a hyper-or hypo-position, depending dn the current state of the organism, its experiential history, as well as the environmental situation. A considerable amount of evidence has accumulated to lend support to this suggestion [7] . However, the results of the experiments reported here emphasize that the effect is not· restricted to feeding or other situations usually thought to involve the organism's control of its internal environment. If this analysis proves viable, the amygdaloid region and its neighbors contain neural mechanisms that operate to control the organism's behavior with respect to his external environment as well. Specific aspects of this mechanism can be further tested in the laboratory. The effect of amygdalectomy on measures of the orienting response (autonomic effector, EEG, and behavioral) can readily be determined. The effect of such lesions, and those of other basal forebrain structures, on an organism's sensitivity to error and other forms of incongruity in various situations can be explored and the element common to this increased sensitivity can be traced. And so on.
Intent is thus initiated. The mechanism to identify environmental regularity is set up in the organism by \'irtue of a neural representation of
• The prediction can be made From this Formulation that only when a reinForcing event occurs at a perceptibly dilferent level or in a perceptibly different pattern From average prior occurrences will it guide subsequent behavior. the prior recurrences of these invariances. Whene\'er this representation includes regularities in the organism's own behavior and the outcome of that behavior, identification of the outcomes of aCtions can become possible-Le" intentions can be initiated. Flexi.hility with respect to the representational process that initiates these intentions appears related to the functions of basal forebrain structures.
The Execution of Intentions
So much for the initiation of intentiom;. Now for their execution. A quotation serves as an appropriate introduction to the relationship between the initiants of intention and their execution, between the behavioral operant and willed action. In his chapter on Lewinian theory Hilgard states that-... this is not unlike Skinner's later notion of the role of the discriminative stimulus in operant behavior: the stimulus does not elicit the behavior, but it does set the occasion for it. The sequence of events from perception [attention] to satiation [habituation] is as follows. The perception of an object or event may give rise to a psychological tension or it may communicate with a state of tension alread~existing, in such a way that this tension system t~ereupon assumes control over motor behavior. The aroused "valences" act as environmental forces steering subsequent behavior. This behavior then leads to satiation or to the resolution of tension so that a state of equilibrium is approached [14, p. 212].
As a result of the recentiy reported experiments already summarized, a somewhat more neuropsychological statement can be made to describe this sequence. \Vhen an organism observes a novel event, an orienting response occurs. This initiates or modifies (Lewin says "gives rise to or communicates with") a representational process in the brain of the organism (Lewin terms this "psychological tension"). In a ta~k situation, this representation comes to include the organism's own behavior and its outcome ("assumes control over motor behavior," according to Lewin) . Any deviation from recurrent behavioral regularities and invariant outcomes signals error. (Lewin speaks of "aroused valences that steer subsequent behavior.';) The resultant modification of the behavior with respect to the representational process leads to habituation ("satiation," "the resolution of tension," in Lewin's words).
Some further notion as to what occurs as the representational process assumes control over behavior can be obtained from additional neurobehavioral analysis of the fixed-interval operant. As aiready noted, performance in this situation is reflected not only in the over-all rate of reward and response, but also in the distributions of responses across the interval between reinforcing events. Obviously, neither the over-alt rate KARL H. PRlBRAM of response nor the scallop is a measure of the accuracy with which the behavior meets the contingency of the situation-only rate of reward measures this. Other descriptive notions must be employed to cover differences in response rate and dishibution. For instance, a conservative approach would characteristically lead to a lower over-all rate of response, whereas a rapid banging-away-at-the-bar might be more fun. Both would be equally effective, as measured by the total niJmber of rewards obtained during the experimental session. When changes in food 'l deprivation alter the response rate, accUracy of response to the situation is not affected. Habituation takes place, i.e., the neural representational process is altered except in animals that have had amygdalectomy. One could describe the events as follows: Food deprivation disposes the anii.
, mal to behave less conservatively; this shows up, in the experimental as wc;ll as in other situations, in heightened generalized reactivity. But note 1 that the distribution of responses across the interval remains unaltered , and the animals invariably get their due. Though amrgdalectomy helped with the analysis of habituation, some other neural mechanism must be ,~. sought if the relation between the representational process and the regulation of response distribution is to be understood. Study of the scallop should give clues about the manner in which the representational process steers the organism's actions. The scallop is, in a way, an externalization in behavior of the mechanism by which the organism'~neural representation of the situation and his actions in that situatieyt are connected-t'i: .. an extemalization of his intentions with respect to the situation. !Experiment 5 [35] . The procedure of this experiment was identi-! cal to that in Experiments I and 2, except that the monkeys were always i fed regularly every 24 hr. Twelve monkeys were used-three recei\'ed bilateral frontal eugranular cortex removals; three others were given control lesions that consisted of bilateral resection of the inferior portion of the temporal isocortex; the remaining six monkeys served as unoperated controls.
The results shown in Fig. 3 reveal no differences between the Q\'er-all rates of response between groups as a result of the experimental procedures. On the other hand, the frontal lesion selecth'ely alters one aspect of the behavior-the scallop. That is, the crescendo-like distribution of responses across the interval is flattened in this group of monkeys. whereas no such effect is obtained in the two control groups. This effect of frontal ablation on fixed-inten'al behavior is thus considerably different from the effects of stan'ation and of amygdalectomy.
Interpretation of experiment 5. In view of the fact that the frontally lesioned animals invariably and selectively press the le\'er when the reinforcing occasion demands, the change in their behavior cannot be attributed to a loss in their ability to make temporal discriminations-they contillue to identify the occasion when reward is to appear. The Graph showing the change in distribution 011 monkeys' response rate following Frontal intrinsic-sector ablation (three monkeys). Note that the distrihution of rate over the interval is not affect~d in the controls (Four monkeys) and after posterior intrinsic-sector ablatiom, (three monkeys). Also note that the lotal rat~of response did not incren~e; rather, rate was somewhat decreased, prohahly due to the ad-libitum feeding period which all groups were given prior 10 op('ration-:tppro:<imately two w('('ks bdore postoperative testing, (Compare with Fig. 2 tion that a variety of manipula-t ions, especially manipulations of cf 10 the organism by means of drugs and brain stimulations and ablations, result in different response patterns in the same situation. To take this into account, the operant, .1 just as the gambling situation, can be."t be looked at as a task or a game. The rules that describe the situation are programed as schedules of discriminath"e and reinforcing stimuli. But nothing happens unle.ss the organism works at the task or plays the game. He thus must acquire sufficient knowhow in the situation to meet the schedules and to make the events happen with some recurrent regularity. He must actively develop a strategy to guide his behavior and, as . already noted, a variety of strategies can be used to meet the rules of the situation. Thus one must infer not only that a neurai representation of the rule.c; of the situation is set up in the organism, but that, as hahituation to the ta"k or game occurs, processes for guiding hehavior with respect to the representation become available to the organism. In short, a variety of succe.c;.sful performances is possible; they have properties that can he described and measured; and further, the several varieties are not uniquely specified by the rules that describe the situation. A process separate from that used to identify the rules must therefore operate to detennine the varieties. "Response chaining" has been suggested to fill this need but offers little more than a descriptive label of the observed behavior and does not get at the regularities in the differences between response chains. What is necessary is a description of the processes that map the neural representation into action. These processes have been called "plans"-the strategies and tactics that connect a neural representation of the invariant properties of a situation with action [28] . Whereas the error-sensing, congruity-incongruity processes detennine the organism's identifications of the properties of his environment, plans detemline his : choice among alternative actions appropriate to these identifications.
The results of Experiment 5 can thus be readily interpreted. Billateral ablation of the frontal eugranular cortex alters the crescendo .~distribution of responses. However, it leaves intact both the over-all rate ,~of response and the accuracy of responding with respect to the occasions . for reward. Therefore, the effects of the lesion cannot be attributed : either to an impairment in the build-up of the neural representational . process nor to an impairment of its modifiability. The effect must then -. be on those other processes that connect the neural representation with action-plans. A wealth of other neuropsychological data can now be properly gathered to support the propriety of this interpretation. .
I·
Clinical neurologists have taken for granted that removals of the precentral motor cortex affect both willed and skilled actions [8] . Will and skill can, on the basis of neuropsychological evidence and analysis, be given separate operational definitions. Intention and volition will refer to processes whose properties are largely determined by plans. SkiJls, on the other hand, refer to processes whose properties are much more intimately meshed into identifications of the environmental situation and especially to the outcomes of action. In the case of skills, the regularities in behavior sequences are sensiti\'e to patterns and schedules of em'ironmental contingencies. This is essentially the same as the classical view of operant conditioning. In the case of will, however, behavioral regularities cannot be ascribed to the rules, but are attributed to the de\'e1opment by the organism of a variety of intentions or strategies to meet the rules. The results of Experiment 5 suggest that interference with intention, or will thus defined, is a function of the anterior frontal eugranular and not of the precentral agranular isocortex. The results of other experiments have also shown that, in spite of resulting clumsiness, the sequence of actions used in opening a latch box is not impaired by precentral-motorcortex ablations whereas these sequences are disrupted by anterior frontal lesions [16, 17, 39] . The prediction can therefore be ventured and tested that anterior frontal lesions would, and precentral lesions would not, affect the scallop-the dist~ibution of responses in the fixed-interval situation. ;\nd such a result would strengthen the body of e\,idenceobtained from introspection, from ordinary social communication about the problem. and from social and clinical obsen'ation and experimenta-". tion-that will and skill can be usefullv distingui~hed,
The contribution of neurobeha\'io'ral cxp~riments can thus be placed i in proper perspective. Such cxperiments-as in the examples shownare often useful in defining i~sues in the bcha\'ioral sciences. The data obtained bridge the gap between the realms of discour.;e used in social and psychological-yes. e\'cn philosophical and humanistic-communications and those used in the biological and physical~cicnces. And in addition. a great deal of understanding is obtained about how the brain functions to regulate behavior.
The nm'e1t;' of recently attained understanding generates entillisiasm, and therefore some o\'erstatements and o\'ergeneralizations occasionallv arc made. (In spite of caution, these may ha~'e crept into the preceding pages, for it is a new and prO\'ocath'e story that is told.) :\nd. when_i, e\'Cr such errors in judgment result, the scientific process (of error 1 sensing) counters the excesses-ai1d~cicntists, through disillusionment, " hard" work, and aiticaL analysis, restore baiance between their neural representations and the state of their art. The following sections deal with these equally important hut somewhat Ic.,,, suhstanth'e problemsõ f the relation between psychology and neurological disciplines.
INTERRELATIONS AMONG METHODS

Fact and Fantasy
One of the ilia jor deterrents to precision in interdisciplinary in\'estigations is confusion between data and theory. Both fact (froni the Latin factum, to make) and theory are scientific constructions based oil the observation and manipulation of \·ariables. Facts can he distinguished as heing either theoretically neutral or systematic. The di~tinction i~, howe\'er. as can he seen from the pursuit of the example detailed ill the section On the Neurology of Intcntion and Will, a complicated one. In the early phases of a science, experimentally produced relations-dataare readily communicable as such. However, as the data-gathering process proceeds, a short-cut terminology begins to dominate communication: . . neuron, reflex, inhibition, s),napse, PTa cortex, association areas, limbic s)'stems on the neurological side; SD, we, reinforcement, fi.\'Cd~illtcT1:al schedule, stimulus, expectation, action, utiliiy, outcome on the hehavioral side. To the group conversant in the terminology-usually the group thaI. has created it-each word or phrase denotes a specific hody of knowl-edge; there is often very little theory involved. But when the base of communication is broadened, differences in the connotative meaning of I the, phrases arise, since the communicants are not all equally conversant , with the data denoted by the phrases. As long as the tenninology is ; denotative, i.e., short-cut for data, the difficulties in communication are
:i~unrtountllble. Explication using longer descriptions, pictorial and jgraphic Illaterial, and direct demonstration can be resorted to. When, "Ifto~eyer, in addition to the short-cut jargon of the laboratory, inter-1,,~ning constructs are postulated and these postulations or hypotheses are !referred to by short-cut phrases (e.g., "habit strength," "drive," "excita-: lory potential") that become intermingled with those denoting data, {J:ommunication, though not impossible, becomes cumbersome. Para-;~do~cally, this lack of true communication is often glossed over by ã~~o ",municative effort that appears to succeed-the translation of the 1ph,~es that refer to one system of hypotheses into the phraseology that 1",~re,rs to another such system (e.g., HuUian into Freudian). Such translaHi9p5, many times removed from data, provide a feeling of satisfaction :lritu~h~does autistic thinking; unfortunately, little of enduring value is {l~~~omplished by either.
j 11' Thus, one. distinction between theoretically neutral and systematic
:~ra:riables can be made. Whenever laboratory argot refers to data (the '! relation between independent and dependent variables) one, might say ;"hat language is theoretically neutral; when intervening vtlnables, and :' especially systems of such variables are referred to, then the language is certainly not theoretically neutral. But this is not the whole story. All words have connotative as well as denotath'e meanings. Most words are 'chosen by the scientist, intentionally or not, because of the body of knowledge a phrase connotes, as well as for the appropriateness to the data to be denoted. Operational definitions overcome this difficulty as long as the communicative base is restricted. Such definitions fail to convey meaning when the defining operations are far beyond the acquaintance of the communicants. In these instances, and they are the ones of interest in a discussion of the interrelationships between sciences, the phrases used denotatively in one science become constructs to the investigator in another science. The behaviorist can either accept or reject the neurologically derived concept of a "hypothaiamus" or a "neuron"; the neurologist can either accept or reject the behaviorally constructed conception of "reinforcement," or "expectation." Neither the psychologist nor the neurologist can modify, on the basis of data, the total conception put forth by his colleague. I believe, therefore, that these conceptions are not, per se, theoretically neutral; neutrality is restricted to the occasions when those who use the concepts are intimately acquainted with the data the conceptions denote.
A final step, by way of ,a relating experiment, is necessary before! ( the facts of one science become more than hypothetical constructs forõ ther sciences. Once this is accomplished, phrases, though they denote t systematic "ariables, again become theoreticall~' apparently neutral to I the communicants im·oh'ed. "Willed action" or "voluntary movement," f already discussed, and "visual field" are cases in point. The concept-f visual field--originates introspectively (as it is differentiated from one's I visual world) [12J, but is in the main deri\'ed from behavioral data; The "isual field is that extent of the environment to which an organism can respond with one eye without moving that eye. The phrase "visual field" stands for the systematization of (1) extent of environment as independently specified by physical techniques, e.g., measuring arc; I (2) fixation of vision-ha"ing an organism look at one point but attend to the surround of that point; (3) make a verbal or instrumental discriminath'e response that is to represent seeing, i.e., iooking and attend 7 ing; and (4) in the final analysis, the phenomena subsumed under "I see." Further, the clinician uses details of the specification of the critical organismic variables that determine the visual field to good purpose. For example, a bitemporal hemianopia suggests a chiasmatic lesion. One \ hardly stops to ponder the theoretical neutrality or lack thereof of the psychological term vision or the physical term field. Ther~are sufficient data denoted by phrases such as "are," "lens," "eye," "optic nerve," "chiasm," . "optic tract," "genicuiostriate system," to make the term visual field theoretically neutral, and,' to all intents and purposes, fact. ' J This neutrality is shaken, however, when new groups of im'estigators gather new data and choose to apply this supposedly neutral term to denote their data. Thus, recent discoveries regarding the effect<; of extrageniculostriate cerebral lesions on the discriminations from which visual fields are inferred ha"e led to confusions [5, 30J. These confusions will not be resolved until new limits are accepted-limits that specify which operations usefully define the concept of visual field.
Data-gathering Methods
The interrelations between psychology and the neurological sciences can be conceived in another fashion. Interrelationships of method are again basic to the development of any reductive discipline. But methods are of two sorts: (I) data gathering, and (2) systematic. So we are back to earlier discussions. In order to be of immediate relevance, data must be so gathered that both neurologicai and behavioral concepts can be constructed from them. in other words, neural and behavioral variables (as well as environmental, of course) determine the data.
When methods are used to study only the behavior of the totai organism in its environment, the resulting data have only an indirect bearing I on neuropsychological formulation-judicious guesses perhaps dignified as hypothetical constructs. Such guesses provide considerable satisfaction to large numbers of behavioral scientists. Of course, when neurobehavioral data become sufficient (as in the determination of the visual field) precise inferences regarding the neural variables can be made from the behavioral data and these can, in tum, lead to further empiric~l neurological explorations. As already noted, clinical neurology and "eurosurgery utilize this method to good advantage. But neurobeh~vioral data are rarely available in such quantity to the behavioral cientist-thus the necessity for neurobehavioral experiment.
't The neurological clinician and scientist usually faces a somewhat different problem. Neurobehavioral data are available to him, but theỹ re i~precise, Both the neural and the behavioral variables have, as .~rille, been only grossly specified. Lesions are in the "front" or in the f',back" parts of the brain; consciousness is perhaps "altered"; intelligence is "impaired." Refinements are proceeding in several clinics and their iaboratories. Progress is in part dependent on increasing the precision of introspectively specified concepts by improving the instrumental tasks used in the neuropsychological analyses-recent advances in i~regard have been rapid [25, 29, 31, 47, 49] . ,\ Some examples may serve to highlight a few of these empirical prob-'ems associated with interdisciplinary research. The assessment, control, nd manipulation of neural variables in neurobehavioral dtperiments ,often lead to heated discussion. Proponents of electrical stimulation decrỹ he limitations of lesion and ablation techniques, and vice versa. The , specific value of the neural-ablation technique is that a relatively stable preparation results. Such stability with respect to the neural variables allows, par excellence, the exploration of the experiential and immediate environmental variables that also determine behavior. Stimulation, electrical and chemical, of nervous tissue provides a different asset-relative reversibility of the process. This reversibility allows repeated controls to check the reliability of the phenomenon observed. However, each laboratory and clinical procedure is restrictive in one way or another-laws and concepts are attained only from judicious combinations of the available procedures. For the behavioral as for the physical sciences, experiments in which obvious limitations are imposed often provide the key to understanding. The laws of mechanics were possible only after experiments were accomplished in which the behavior of a sphere or an inclined plane could be observed-watching birds in Right could initiate the problem, not solve it. Neuropsychological laws are more likely to result from experiments in which the behavior of brain-Iesioned monkeys is observed in an operant conditioning or a discrete trial-discrimination apparatlls than from watching people with normal brains behave in unstructured situations.
Since neural function in beha\'ior is the prime intere5t of the neuro-' yrhftl(lgi5t, the b(ld~' ftf data mU5t include the r(,,5ult.~nf an extensh'c exploration of relevant em'ironmental variables. In the past, failure to , realize this has led to so-called "inconsistencies of neurobeha\;oral fact." :\5 recently as a decade ago, the notion was prevalent that neurobe-: havioral data, both animal and human, were destined to be totally un_ l reliable. Rc~;ults of experiments and ob5er\'ations were difficult to replicate. The history of frontal lobotomy and the now-famous story of the amygdalcctornized Baltimore cats [4) versus the Washington cats [42) i i~I BENNY 5 Alert, active food getter preadolescent male rhesus show that when adequate control of both the environmental and the, organismic variables i'l accomplished and a sufficient behavioral reper-i toire is explored, discrepancies ali but vanish: The behavior of amygda-: lectomized cats is that of normal cats in home territory; after surgery cats can no longer make the distinction between home and foreign territories.
Another example of the clarification of the diversity of the effects of brain operations on social behavior is illustrated in Figs. 4, 5, 6 , and 146 KARL II. PRIBR.ur 7 [33] . As can be seen, the effects of amygdalectomy are as much a consequence of the immediately postoperati\'e dominance situation as they are the consequence of locus of the lesion. Such are some examples of the special ambiguities that brain ablation and clinical neurological lesion studies encounter unless precautions are undertaken to ensure precision. These special problems have been dealt with at length in an earlier paper [33] . It is sufficient to note here ;~! that properly used, satisfying precision can be attained today from these much maligned surgically and pathologically produced data from which stem practically all of our knowledge about the relations between brain and behavior.
Bridging Laws and l\lethods of Systematizing
But methods are not all ob~en'alional and experimental. :\nalysis and treatment of data are as important as data gathering. Neurologists especially have been prone to comidcr precision in data analysis to be unnecessarily statistical or a matter of~clllantics..-\ftcr all, docs it really matter whether we say "afferent" or "sensory"; "efferent" or "motor"? 
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AfTerent and efTerent refer to neural data; motor and sensory refer to behadoral data. The terms began to lose their distinction as a result of the m·ergeneralization of the law of BeU and Mageridie. The resultc onsiderahle confusion and, in addition, suppression of findings such as direct afTerents reaching the precentral motor cortex; eye movements obtained from stimulation of the occipital "isual area [27, 34) . is made to give operational definitions of concepts such as those of will,:: intention, reinforcement, anxiety, or stimulus, even when the difficulty I' of the problem becomes apparent only after such attempts at definition i' [22, 23, 36, 48) . In a similar manner, there is often heard an outcry r against the use of precise hlOdels-physical or mathematical. The accu-r sation runs that anaiogicai thinking is fuzzy thinking, but this is notñ ecessarily so. According to the\-iew taken here, all behaviorally derived r concepts are in the final analysis (or the initial one, or both) analogically i : compared with introspectively derived concepts. The properties of the: , or explicitly) to subsume any fairly extensive body of data; at different stages of the science, different le,'cls of precision in models are pos:~ible and useful in generating testable hypotheses. In some areas, neuropsychology is ready for precise mode6, e.g., ,'ision [12] , reinforcement " [36] j in other areas somewhat Icss rigorously fomlUlated models are more useful, e.g., intention, affect. But one caution must be voiced. l\lodels are not'laws, though ideally they are based on the determination of lawful relationships between variables. When models are constructed from systematizations of hypo-thetical constructs or intervening \'ariables, they are apt to lose power, II since almost any set of phenomena seemingly can be explained if a suffi· cient number of hypotheses are admitted. This wa:; the error of the early 11 mathematical biophysicists, and of the Hullians, and currently it may be II the Aaw in the arguments of the statistical-learning theorists. Truly use·f ul models make analogies between set,; of lawful empirical relationships, t not between the hypotheses derh'ed from such relationships. Such model,; t are hard to come by, since a great deal of empirical work must precede f them.
I .-\nd, of course, though some kind of sy:;telllatization of data is nee-t es..~ary, not all systematization need be formally theoretical. ..\side from l supporting data, spans of communal interest in problems shared by those t working on either side of the neuropsychological chasm lllay suffice. The. complexity of the systems studied in the behavioral sciences (of which i neuropsychology is one) makes pos-~ible the collection of a \'ast amount' of data, which, if irrele\'ant to any kind of systematization, is lost be· , cause information transmission becomes too costly. But the systematization can be of two sorts: relevance to a practical problem (e.g., psychosurgery) or to a theoretical formulation (e.g., information-measure-' . ment.4heory). These' two approaches to systematization are not asm uttlally exdush'e as some of the proponents of one as against the other will have WI think. (Psychosurgery alters information processing by patient';; models of information proces.~ing are used by computer engineers. ) Only the scientist's temperament raises. the issue of i":corilpatibility.~ly own preference is that proposed b~' Shaw in his Don Juan: \\·hen bored with hea\'enly theory, the problems of the flesh are refresh· ing;~'hen, in tum, these pall, a return to the upper reaches of li.bstrac. 0 tion is welcome.
A Psychological, Subjective Behaviorism This Aexible; though precise, approach to the' mind·brain issue has implications that transcend neurop.c;ychology per .'Ie {28]. Once' a truly moni.c;tic (yet paradoxically pluralistic) approach to simultaneous in· terdisciplinary study at several Id'els is attained, some old problems can be seen in a new light~xperiinentscan be designed and patients tan be approached in ways up to now plagued by confusion. BrieA)', the approach here taken can be summarized as follows: All scientific inquiry begins with introspection. A first step toward precision is made when these introspections can be verbalized or in some other way communi· cated to others. The philosophy of science is concerned with such con· sensual \'alidations [41] . The job of psychologists is to gi\'e prerision to one aspect of the scientific universe of discourse. Briefly, the propo:;al . ,,' , j.qi'!distinct that no relation between them is recognizable, the be-I :")iorlllly. derived concept is apt to be trivial.
.";;lThis, problem of collating concepts deri\'ed from obsen'ed data WIth jintrospectively deri\'ed is logically the oln'erse in the psychological /;:~:ithe physical sciences, ,\n apparent handicap to the solutio~of the ..: ,blem'for psychology is that psychological concepts do not hKe the at-"'~Qte of projection, Whereas a table appears to he "out there," my per-"ption of it appears to be "in here." But this \'ery attribute has been Jamee:t for the difficulties encountered in the philosophy of the physical world. So perhaps psychological philosophy has the easier task at that, i;; According to this ,'jew, the philosopher and the psychologist ha,"C the common task of relating observational and experimental data to phenomenological data. The philosopher of science, aided by the burgeoning dC"e\opments in linguistics, is especially concerned with the verbal analysis of language as this describes phenomenal interrelations. The behavioral psychologist on the other hand, is especially interested in -instrumental a'nd-'other nom'erhal beha\:ior and in the non linguistic uses of verbal behavior. As already noted, concepts that result from obser....ations of beha\'ior are likely to be tri\'ial unless they are initially close to those derived from introspection. E,'en the most rigorous beha,'ioristic psychology must not he completely sundered from the phenomena which originally gave birth to psychological inquiry. Howe,-er, when the beha\'iorally deri,'ed concepts are not distinguishable from the phenomenological, an objective psychology is thwarted_ Thus the distinction must be gradually attained. Some introspectively conceived phenomenon must be tentati\'cly externalized by the sugges-tion that an obserYed behavioral process is representath'e of the phenomenon. For imtance, the discomfort which one recurrently feels and which leads to eating behavior is labeled as "hunger." When its characteristic~are more clearly specified, "appetite" may be the more appropriate label. The eating characteristics of other organisms may be ohc;en'ed and these also found to be cyclical. The cycles can be accentuated by manipulations of the accessibility of food and the specific characteristics examined by the manipulations of the accessibility of different types of edible objects.
This extemalization of the introspectively derived concept can then be approached in a variety of ways. Deprivation variables, neural variables, endocrine variables, situational variables, and somatic variables can be studied as' these affect the eating process.. And gradually lawful relationships between the consuming of food and some of these variables can be noted. Furthermore, obstacles can be placed in the path,of consuming behavior. And again, the interaction of the various classes of variables with each other can be lawfully described. During this series of experiments some of these laWful relationships may be ide~tified with hunger. For instance, it may be suggested that the number of hours of depri~ation correlates' specifically with the state of the organism which is introspectively defined as hunger. But when this identification is made, it very quickly becomes inadequate. For, introspectively; the hunger mechanism is cyclic and hours of deprivation do not correiate Iinellriy with what is felt.
Experiments are again undertaken to demonstrate this added diinension of the phenomenon. On the other hand, the laboratory rna>' sh~,as it actually has, that there is not a one-to-one cor:relation between hoW much an organism will eat when food is easily acces.o:;ible and how much work that organism will do to overcome ail obstacle in order to eat. This kind of observation cari then be referred back to introspection and differences can be distinguished between hunger and appetite, between zest for food and zest for search, and between search artd:a·tendency to complete actions once they are initiated. Each of these in tum is only vaguely specified by the introspection. Some of the distinctions may be erroneous; others incorrectly drawn. Again, extemalization into the laboratory can sharpen the distinctions.
Gradually a more and more precise description and empirical analysis of the behavioral process can be attained and a scientific, multilevel understanding of the conception under scrutiny follows this ever-widening and deepenin~spiral of definition and empirical evidence. In this stepwise process, the reductive empirical and experimental analysis of the mindbrain problem has an important place.
What This discordance cannot be explained away by \'erbal magic. Nor is the classical dualistic frame more than a giving-up. For aside from the paucity of empirically precise data soundly systematized, the most important deterrent to fruitful inquiry into the relation between psychology and neurology has been philosophic dualism. Such dualism has taken two especially pernicious forms, extreme psychophysical parallelism and pscudomonism. l\'fany eminent philosophers, neurologists, and neurophrsiologists, and some psychologists, have settled into a comfortable journey along the parallel rails of the physical and the psychical. Rails that are wishfully belie\'ed to extend to some future infinity called "correspondence." Pseudomonists on the other hand, whether they be extreme materialists or extreme phenomenologists fail to face the issue squarely. By volubly denying the alternath'es, pseudomonists in fact accept them by default. Neurological concepts arc founded in neural data, psychological concepts in beha"ioral data. Wordb y themselves cannot transfonn the one into the other. Efperimental and observational evidence is needed before useful transla~oa'ls between the results of systematizations of neural and of behadoral data are accomplished.
If either of these dualistic approaches is accepted, the bridge between the beha\'ioral sciences and humanities on the one hand, and the physical and biological sciences on the other, can never be constructed. As a result, both ,worlds will be impo\'erished because of lack of communication between thelll. Recognition that the problem, though difficult, can be approached and solutions approximated, though ne\'er completely attained, should gi\'e rise to a new way of scientific inquiry. If the methods of early classical phr~ics as we see them from this distance are slavishly followed, then rapprochement between science and man's humanistic endea\'ors can ne\'er he attained. The proposal set forth in a recent publication [28] is that the scientist has often followed and should explicitly follow a path hitherto reserved for the' artist: i.e., enactment and reenactment of his internalized representation of the world. Analysis and systematization have an important part in enactment but they are not the whole story. Explication by the judicious usc of highl}' perfected technical analogy is admitted. Already this has occurred in the efforts of the physical and mathematical model builders. When these analogies are specifically labeled for what they are and a continuous check between model and systematically analyzed data is made, the process-far from being pernicious-is the only hope for a unified universe of discourse among all of man's endeavors. This approach includes systematizations with respect to models, with respect to theories, with respect to urgent problems such as those provided hy the clinic. The horizons hitherto reserved for the poet and the humanist become the frontier of behavioral science. :\nd at the core of the~e endeamrs lie such multilevel reductive disciplines as neuropsychology. Without giving lip precision, a wider range of problems is thus admitted to the scientific enterprise. This approach, dubbed psychological or subjecti'"e behaviorism, ,reaffirms that a recently neglected subject matter for a scientific and experimental psychology is after aU appropriate-the study of man by man.
WHERE THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST?
Unless the reducti'"e scientist is especially wary, his problem-oriented discipline can become dangerously superficial. The hard work of methodological mastery is doubly his. Techniques must be acquired wherever the problems lead him-and, as is already evident, the problems lead him far. The tools of data gathering are not always easy to acquifle, To obtain data' relevant to a particular problem from operant equipment is at times a frustrating task. To ha\:e an animal die for iack of surgical judgment or tender postoperative care after that animal has been subjected to many mohths of rigorous behavioral testing can be a devastating experience. Or, having accomplished successfully the datagathering proces.'l, the statistical, mathematical, and iogical tools may not be at hand to make maximum tise of the findings. Where are the neurologists who today are sufficiently acquainted with linguistics or with statistical behavioristics to interpret within a broader scientific frame the uniquely a"ailable opportunities to study language disturbances? Where is the psychologist \vho knows enough about the brain to discuss the mechanisms of the creation of infonnation-information which he so glibly communicates and so noisily discriminates? Certainly competent neuropsychologists are not to be found in abundance. the reasons for this are several; not the least of which is tite lag in institutional acceptance of new areas of scientific development.
Effort<; are being made by many institutions to provide a place for neuropsychologists to work and teach. Departments of psychology at universities are showing a new inter-est in physiologicaJ psychology. Departments of anatomy and of physiology more and. more frequently find their neuroanatomists and neurophysiblogists engaged in neurobehavioral work. Departments of pharmacology and the pharmaceuticai houses are increasingly staffed by scientists of this new discipline. But in the spot where he is most needed, the neuropsychologist is as yet practically tin-known. Departments of psychiatry in medical schools and psychiatric institutes are slow to recognize the advantages that the new discipline offers. The historical fact that psychiatry stems from faculties of medicine, while psychology stems from faculties of philosophy has estranged the medical discipline from its basic sciences. One might expect clinical psychology to prodde the necessary impetus toward the development of a rapprochement. But that this has not happened is fact; just as it is fact that pathology has had only a limited effect in providing such rapprochement in medicine and surgery. Neurops~'chologyis concerned with medical physiology and chemistry; neuropsychology is a behavioral science.
The neuropsychologist is at home as much with the effects of altering the chemical structure of an antihistamine to produce chlorpromazine as he is with the concept of role. He is as much at home with the organization of the ventrobasal nuclear complex of the mammalian thalamus as he is with the process of consensual validation. Does today's psychiatric training have comparable reach? How else is the trainee to cope with the new developments in his field which come from the sociai, the intrapersonal, and the neurochemical directions? The impressive ad\'ances in the caliber of medical training during the past half century have been associated with the interest generated in the basic sciences ..concerned with the medical disciplines. Psychiatry is sure to profit from the example [6) . Now that the most ardent psychoanalysts are begivining to remember that Freud first formulated his conceptions from neurobehavioral as well as from strictly behavioral evidence [19) ; now that the organicists have beensufficientIy exposed to the importance of experiential and other socioem'ironmental factors so as not to ignore them completely, perhaps neuropsychiatry is ready to welcome and give adeqi.iate berth to one of its most essential basic disciplines--neuropsychology.
But irrespective of where he finds himself-and the locations may be many-the neuropsychologist has an interesting task ahead. And his is perhaps the most important in this latter half of the twentieth century: to help establish the dignity of man as a scientific as well as a political tenet.
In our own culture the cleavage of the "spiritual" from the "natural," which is a sun'ival from the most ancient mythologies, has fostered popular ideologies of religious fanaticism, class rivalries, and political antagonisms that are biologically unfit and even suicidal because they result in social disintegration. Our ultimate survi\·al is endangered as long as ideological fantasies that are incompatible with things as they are control individual and national patterns of behavior. We must somehow manage to heal this artificial dismembennent of the human personality before we can hope for a pennanent cure of the present disorder [c. J VOSON HERRICK. The evolution of human nature, pp. ·H6-420].
